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tance of about three and one-half miles. The appellee did not
state in his evidence that the weather was unpleasant or disagreable,
from any cause, or that the tow-path was in bad condition, in any
way; nor did he claim that he had been injured, sickened or even
fatigued by his evening walk.
Wc need not and will not dwell upon the question; for it seems
to us, that the bare statement of this matter, as the appellee has
gted it in his evidence, is convincing and conclusive proof that
the damages were excessive. This cause was well assigned, and
foti it, we think a new trial ought to have been granted. (The
reihinder of the opinion was upon a point not of general interest.)
Judgment reversed.
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AGENT.

Loss-An agent who deposits money
'
.D
of-ohi9 1prnne'1A&' howq.credit in a bank, without the principal's conk ;of such deposit: Sarqeant v. Downey, 49 Wis.
seht, takes'ei'al'h"rih
ASSINMENT. See Vendor and Vendee.
BANKRUPTCY

Pim Debt by Partner-SubsequentdisciargeinBank,
Assjtio'n
rip r-ne uTomse to h-partner to pay the Debt.-Where one of
1ormerik under obligations to the other to pay a partner
partners
two
shi lebtbis discharge in bankruptcy, though obtained.in pursuance
oa onposition with his creditors, including the creditor of the former
firth, while it relieves him from his obligation to his former partner to
pay the firm debt, does not discharge such former partner from liability
for the unpaid balance of such debt; and a new promise by the bankIPrepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinion,
iled during Oct. Term 1879. The cases will probably be reported in 10 or 11 Otto.
2 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter ; to appear in 32 N. J. Eq. Reports.
3 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 35 Ohio St. Reports.
4 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 95 Illinois Reports.
5 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 48 or 49 Wis. Reports.
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rupt to his co-debtor, made pending the bankruptcy proceedings or
afterwards, to pay such balance, is binding: Hill v. Trainer, 49 Wis.
Writ of Error-Substitutionof Assignee.-After an adjudication
bankruptcy, the assignee of the bankrupt is the proper party to bring in
a
writ of error to reverse a decree agaiust the bankrupt, and he alone
can
do it, and where the writ has been sued out before by the bankrupt,
his
assignee, after the adjudication, may be substituted as a party, and prosecute the writ of error in his name: Jenkins v. Greenbaum, 95 Ills.
BILLS AND NOTES.
See Husband and Wife.
Place of Payment-Addrpss of Drawee on Bill-Protest.-Where
a
bill of exchange is directed to a drawee at a particular place
and is
accepted by him without explanation or condition, such place
is the
place of payment, althugh the drawee resides elsewhere; Cox
v.
-AationalBank of N Y., S. C. U. S., October Term 1879.
It makes no difference in this respect, that the place is a city, and
no mention is made of any dwelling or place of business where the that
bill
should be presented; Id.
After due endeavor and failure to find the acceptor or
place of
business, a protest made at such city at the only place where his
the acceptor
was known to transact business is sufficient: Id.

hzterest-Days of Grace -On mere instalments of interest, the debtor
is not entitled to days of grace; Mtacloon v. Smith, 49 Wis.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See United States Courts.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Municipal Corporaton-Right to maintain Wharves on navigable
Waters andcollect Wiyage -A municipal corporation, owning improved
wharves and other artificial means which it has provided and maintains,
at its own cost, for the benefit of those engaged in commerce upon
the
public navigable waters of the United States, is not prohibited by
the
national constitution from charging and collecting from those using
its
wharves and facilities, such reasonable fees as will fairly remunerate
for the use of the property. Packet Co. v. Keokuk. 95 U. S. 88, affirmed it
:
X. W. Vnion Packet Co. v. St. Louis, S. C. U. S., October Term
1879.
CORPORATION.
See Taxation.
Answer by-Acts of De facto Officers-Determ ination of validity
of
Election in collateral Suit.-When a change occurs in the officers
of a
corporation between the time it is brought into court and the time
when
its answer is filed, the answer must. be filed by the persons who
are
officers at the time of the filing: The Mechanics' National Bank
of
Newark v. The H. C. Burnett Manufacturing Company, 32 N. J.
Eq.
The acts of the de facto officers of' a corporation are valid, so far,
at
least, as they create rights in faivor of third persons : Id.
A de facto officer is one who has the reputation of being the officer
he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law: I7d.
It is no defence to a suit brought by the de facto officers of a corporation that they were not legally elected: Id.
A court of equity has no authority to determine the validity of the
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election of the officers of a private corporation, and pronounce judgment
of amotion, but when the question of the validity of such an election
necessarily arises in the determination of a suit properly cognisable by a
court of equity, it will determine it, as it would any other question of
law or fact necessary to be decided to settle the rights of the parties:

Td.
CRIMINAL LAw.
Evidence-Dying Declarations.-The general rule of evidence is,
that dying declarations are admissible only when the death of the
declarant is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the
death are the subject of the dying declarations: The State of Ohio v.
.Harper, 35 Ohio St.
Forgery-Evidence--Presumption of Intent-Flght of AccusedComments of State's Attorney outside of the Evidence.-It is necessary to
prove, on the trial of one indicted for forgery, an attempt to defraud the
person named in the indictment as intended to be defrauded. This
intent may be clearly shown by proof of uttering the forged instrument,
and if not passed, circumstantial evidence: Fox v. The People, 95 Ill.
Evidence of statements or admissions in reference to the note for the
forgery of which the person accused is being tried are admissible, but
what he has said of another note said to have been forged is not admissible to prove the charge on which he is being tried: Id.
There is no presumption of law of an intent to defraud from proof
that the accused has actually forged a note on another person when he
has not uttered the same, but this is a question of fact for the jury to
find from the evidence, as, his possession of the same and the surrounding circumstances. The possession of the forged paper, while evidence
tending to prove a fraudulent intent, is not conclusive. The circumstances may clearly repel any presumption of guilt: Id.
It is error to instruct a jury, on the trial of one for an alleged crime,
that his flight is evidence of guilt. It is only evidence tending to
prove guilt. Nor should the court tell the jury that if flight was
proved, it must be satisfactorily explained consistent with the innocence
of the accused. This might be understood as requiring him to prove
an innocent purpose beyond doubt: Id.
It is the duty of the court, on the trial of one when his life or liberty
is involved, to stop the state's attorney in his closing argument, when
he assumes facts not proved and urges them for a conviction. Such
conduct is unfair to the accused, and he should be protected by the
court. When such unfairness is gross, a judgment of conviction, in a
doubtful case, should be reversed: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Sheriff's Sale.

DIVORCE.
Desertion of Wife- Willingness to return.-If a wife deserts without
cause, and afterwards realizes that she has acted foolishly, and would
retuin if the way was opened for her, but her husband refrains from
doing anything to induce her to return, for the purpose of making her
absence a ground of divorce, her desertion is not obstinate : Trall v.
TraIl, 82 N. J. Eq.
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But a husband is not bound to attempt to induce his wife to return,
when it is clear any effort in that direction will be unavailing : Id.
EQUITABLE CONVERSION.

EQUITY.

See Partnership.

See Laehes ; 4unicipal Coporations; Trust ; Usury.

Election of Remedy-Court of Equity Taking Jurisdiction will *-iv
Complete Remedy.-'To a foreclosure suit, a creditor, claiming, by his
attachment, a lien on the debt, was made a party, and an injunction
staying his proceedings at law granted. After a sale of the premises
under the foreclosure and payment of the money into court: Held that,
his motion to dissolve the injunction and proceed at law must be denied,
and that he must litigate his claim in this court: Pine v. Shannon, 32
N. J. Eq.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
See Bankruptcy.
Supersedeas Bond-Fraudin procuring-Settingaside-New Bond.
-Where the approval of a supersedeas bond upon appeal, is obtained by
fraud, the Appellate Court will, upon discovery and proof of the fraud,
set aside the bond: Florida Central Railroadv. Schulte, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1879.
If the appellant was a party to the fraud, or concealed from the
justice approving the bond material facts in reference to its procurement, a new bond will be refused: Id
ESTOPPEL.

See Landlord and Tenant.

See Criminal Law; Limitations, Statute of.
Marriae-Legitimacy.-On a question of legitimacy, a marriage
certificate proved to be genuine, and, produced by and from the custody
of the mother of the person whose legitimacy is in question, is competent
evidence and strongly corroborative proof of the alleged marriage:
Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 32 N. J. Eq.
Where the legitimacy of a person is in issue, an acknowledgment of
him by his parents' kinsmen as their relation may be given in evidence
as evidence of the marriage which must have preceded his birth if
lawful : Id.
Explanation of Written Instruments by Parol-Offersof Compromise
-Admissions.--Where the effect of a written instrument collaterally
introduced in evidence, depends not merely on its construction and
meaning, but also upon extrinsic facts and circumstances, the inferences
to be drawn from it are inferences of fact and open to explanation by
parol evidence: West v. Smith, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Offers of compromise, as a general rule, are not admissible against
the party making the offer, but if admitted they are open to explanation
whether made by oral or written communication : Id.
FIXTURE. See Landlord and Tenant.
FORFEITURE. See Insurance.
EVIDENCE.

FORMER ADJUDICATION.

Foreclosuresuit-Lien Creditorsproving Claims before liaster-Effect
of Decree.-In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the lienholders were so
numerous that it was impracticable to bring them all before the court,
VOL. XXIII.--66
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and some of them were allowed to prosecute for the benefit of all; and
a special master having been* appointed, with instruction to report the
names of the lienholders, and the amount due each, those who appeared
before the master and proved their claims are as much bound by a judgment or order affecting the subject-matter of the suit as if they had
been formally made parties: Carpenter v. Canal Co., 35 Ohio St.
GARNISHMENT.

Municipal Corporation- County orderin Clerk's Handsnot attachable.
-A municipal corporation (in this case a county) is not subject to garnishment; and one who holds property of a debtor, merely as agent of
such a corporation, cannot be garnished in respect thereof: .fXerrell v.
Campbell, 49 Wis.
Even if a county were liable to garnishment, the process would not
reach an undelivered county order in favor of the debtor, in the county
clerk's hands: Id.
A delivery of such an order by the clerk to the sheriff, upon service
of process of garnishment, does not bind the county and subject it to
garnishment: Id.
HIGHWAY.

Sidewalk- Obligation of Town to keep in Repair.-In cities of this
state, the use, for a series of years, by the people travelling on foot along
a public highway, of a part of such highway as a sidewalk or foot-path,
on one or both sides of the carriage-way, constitutes such path or walk
a portion of the "travelled part" of such highway, which the city is
bound to keep in repair and in safe condition for such use, and renders
the city liable for injuries resulting from a neglect of that duty; James
v. City of Portage,48 or 49 Wis.
I
Injury to abutting Property-Title by adverse Possession-Interest.In an action for an injury to abutting property by reason of the construction of a railroad on a public street or highway, the plaintiff's title
may be established by proof of adverse possession -The Lawrence Railroad Co. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St.
In awarding damages for an injury resulting from a tort, compensation in the nature of interest may be included: Id.
See Divorce; Evidence; Limitations, Statute of.
Promissory note of WMfe as Surety--Liability of Separate EstateEuit.-A
married woman, having a separate estate, may charge the
same, in equity, by the execution of a promissory note as surety for her
husband or another: Williams v. Urmston, 35 Ohio St.
Where a married woman, having a separate estate, executes a promissory note as surety for the principal maker, a presumption arises that
she thereby intends to charge her separate estate with its payment;
and a court of equity will carry such intention into effect by subjecting
such estate to the payment of the debt, in the mode prescribed by the
statute: Levi v. Earl, 30 Ohio St. 147, and Rice v. Railroad, 32 Id.
380, in so far as they conflict with the decision in this case, are overruled: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

INFANT.

Liability of Fatherfor Support.-A father is bound to support 'tm
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infant child, if of sufficient ability, even though the child may have an
ample estate of its own, but if the fhther is not able to support his child,
or not able to support it according to its station and expectations, a
court of equity may appropriate its own estate to its support: Stephens
v. Howard's Executors, 32 N. J. Eq.
INSURANCE.

Wairer of Proofof Loss-egligence of Insured.-A policy required
immediate notice, and proof of loss within thirty days. The notice was
given, and a protest made out on the day the loss occurred, which was
afterward handed to the insurer's adjuster, when he came to investigate
the loss, who made the objection that it did not state the cause of the
loss, but went on and made a full investigation, after which he told the
insured that he did not think the insurer would pay, as he had shown
no cause of loss, and that it must have been from unseaworthiness of the
boat or negligence; but promised that after he made his report he would
write and inform him whether the insurer would pay: and he reported
all the facts, whereupon the insurer decided that it was not liable, and
so informed the agents, through whom the insurance was effected,
without stating the ground of the decision, and the adjuster did not
write to the insured as he had promised : Held, that, whether there
had been a waiver of proof of loss by the insurer, was properly left to
the jury, under appropriate instructions The Ente):rise Insurance Co.
v. Parisot,35 Ohio St.
Where a vessel is lost by a peril insured against, the insurer will be
liable. although the loss might have been avoided by the exercise of
proper care on the part of those in charge of the vessel at the time
of the loss: 11.
INTEREST.

See Bills and Notes; Highways; Usury.
INTOXICATING

LIQUORS.

Evidence-Purchase from others than Defendant-Damages for
Death.-In an action under the Act of 1870 (67 Ohio L. 102), to
recover damages to means of support by reason of intoxication, caused
by liquors alleged to have been sold continuously, during a period of
three years, to a person in the habit of getting intoxicated, the defendant may offer evidence to show that, during the same period, such
person became intoxicated by liquors, which he purchased of other
persons : Kirchner v. Mfyers, 35 Ohio St.
Under said Act of 1870, for injury to means of support in consequence
of intoxication, which caused the death of the intoxicated person,
damages resulting from the death cannot be recovered: Davis v. Justice,
31 Ohio St 359, approved: Id.
LACHES.

Equitable Right-Mere Delay.-Mere delay alone, short of the
periid fixed as a bar by the Statute of Limitations, will not preclude
the a- srtion of an equitable right. Where the adverse party is not
lulled into security by the delay, or prejudiced thereby, the defence of
laches cannot be considered : Gibbons v. .Hoag, 95 Ill.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Building on another's Land-Estoppel by Lease-Fiture--Mortgge.
-A mortgage was given in January 1872. In November 1873, the
defendant, a son of the mortgagor, moved a frame building upon the
premises, where he placed it on a stone foundation, which he built, and
aftrwards used it as a shop and dwelling. The premises were sold,
under foreclosure, in December 1877, and bought by the mortgagee,
whereupon the defendant agreed to pay rent for the house and lot, and
did so from January to December 1878. In January 1879, proceedings were begun to remove him for non-payment of rent, and he then
claimed that the building belonged to him, and asserted his right to
remove it as a trade fixture. He was restrained from doing so by
injunction. Held, without determining the question whether such a
building is, as between mortgagor and mortgagee, a trade fixture, that
the defendant is, by leasing such building after the foreclosure sale,
and paying rent therefor, estopped from setting up title thereto in
himself: Betts v. Wurth, 32 N. J. Eq.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Coverture-Proofofby Cohabitation.-Where coverture is relied on to
save an action from the bar of the Statute of Limitations, the marriage
may be shown by proof of cohabitation as husband and wife: Lawrence
Railroad Co. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St.
MARRIAGE.

MINES.

See Evidence.
See Waste.

License to dig Ore-Revocation of.-Abandonment.-A contract
giving a party an exclusive right to dig ore in certain lands, no estate
or interest in the land being granted, is a license and not a grant or
demise: The East Jersey Iron Co. v. Wright, 32 N. J. Eq.
Unless coupled with an interest, or an equity has been created by
acts done in pursuance of a license, a license is always subject to revocation in either of the following methods: (1), by the will of the
licensor; (2), by the death of either of the parties, or (3), by a conveyance of the land upon which it was intended to operate: Id.
Where a mining license is granted by a licensor, for the purpose of
having his lands explored and their mineral resources developed, and it
contains a provision that if the licensee concludes to abandon digging
ore, he shall notify the licensor, if the licensee, after making an opening
in the lands and finding a large deposit of ore, does in fact abandon the
enterprise, because the ore is comparatively valueless, he will be held to
have abandoned the mine, though he gave no formal notice: Id.
MORTGAGE.

See Landlord and Tenant.

Recital of Unrecorded Mortgage in Deed-Notice to Judgment
Creditors.-An unrecorded mortgage was excepted, by express words,
in a subsequent conveyance of the lands by the mortgagor, and that deed
recorded. Afterwards the mortgage was recorded: Held, that such exception was constructive notice to judgment-creditors of the grantee, "
whose judgments were recovered before the mortgage was recorded
Weatervelt v. Wyckoff, 32 N. J. Eq
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Release of-Effect as to Subsequent Encumbrance.-Tf a prior mortgagee releases part of the mortgaged premises, to the prejudice of a
subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser, with notice of such subsequent
mortgage or deed, his release will operate as a discharge of his lien, to
the extent of the value of the land released: Cogswell v. Stout, 32 N.
J. Eq.
As a general rule, a mortgagee is not chargeable with notice, by construction, of rights acquired in the mortgaged premises subsequent to the
execution of his mortgage : Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
See Constitutional Law; Highway;
Payment.
Contractsfor Work to bepaidfor by Property Owners- When 'unreasonable will be Relieved against.-Where a city charter does not require
contracts for building sidewalks at the expense of the adjoining lots to
be let to the lowest bidder after advertising for proposals, although such
contracts may be made by private agreement with the city, they must
bc fairly made, at reasonable prices, with due regard to the lot owner's
interests, or equity will relieve against them: Cook v. City of Racine,
49 Wis.
NATIONAL BANKS.

Taxation- Valuation of Shares- Unequal Taxation.-The provision
of the National Bank Law, that state taxation on the shares of the banks
shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed on other moneyed capital
in the hands of citizens of the state, has reference to the entire process
of assessment, and includes the valuation of the shares as well as the
ratio of percentage charged on such valuation : The People, ex rd.
Williams v. Weaver et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
The statute of New York of 1866. which permits a debtor to deduct
the amount of his debts from the valuation of all his personal property,
including moneyed capital, except his bank shares, taxes those shares at
a greater rate than other moneyed capital, and is therefore void as to
the shares of national banks: .1d.
Trxation- IUnequal Taxation through Variation in Moe of Assessment-Remedy in Equity.-Although the statutes of a state provide for
the valuation of all moneyed capital for the purposes of taxation, ut its
true cash value, including shares of the national banks, the systematic
and intentional valuation of all other moneyed capital by the taxing
officers far below its true value, while national bank shares are assessed
at their full value, is a violation of the Act of Congress, which prescribes
the rule by which those shares shall be taxed by state authority: Pelton
v. The Commercial NationalBank, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Tn such a case, on a payment or tender of the sum which the bank
shares ought to pay under the rule established by the Act of Congress,
a court of equity will enjoin the state authorities from collecting the
remainder: .d.
NEGLIGENCE.
See Insurance.
What Questionsfor Jury.-What is proper care to be exercised by a
plaintiff suing for an injury caused by negligence is a question of law,
but whether such care, which is ordinary care, has in fact been exercised
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in the conduct of a party in a given case, is a question of fact, which
may be properly submitted to the jury: Stratton v. Centennial City
Horse Railway Co., 95 Ill.
NOTICE.
See Mortgage.
PARTNERSHIP.
See Bankruptcy.
Real Estat--Equitable Cbnversion.-By articles of partnership, M.
and A. stipulated that at the end of three months after the death of
either of them, a valuation of all their partnership assets and property,
including real estate, should be made, according to the amount of capital invested; and that the survivor should have one year thereafter to
take and pay the value of such share to the legal representatives of the
decedent. One partner (A.) died intestate: Reld, that M. was entitled
to specific performance of the contract, which of itself constituted an
equitable conversion of the real estate, and that the proceeds must be
divided among the intestate's next of kin: Aaddock v. Astbury, 32
N. J. Eq.
PAYMENT.

When not Voluntary-Assessment forlfunicipalPurposes-Fraud.Only one-half of the cost of laying certain pipes being chargeable by
law to plaintiff's lot, if plaintiff paid the whole of such cost (included
in the taxes charged against her upon the city tax roll), not knowing
what the actual cost was, and under a belief, caused by fraudulent mis.
representations of the city officers, that sbe was charged with only half
the cost, this is not a voluntury payment: Harrisonv. City of Milwaukee,
49 Wis.
If the city charter gave plaintiff the right to appeal from the assessment to the circuit court within a specified time, that remedy cannot be
held exclusive so as to prevent a recovery by action brought in the circuit court, of the excess in the amount paid in ignorance of the facts,
through fraudulent misrepresentations of the officers: d.
PLEADING.
See Practice.
PossEssION. See Hiqhway.
Occupancy of Part- When Motlce.-The actual possession of a part
of a tract of land by a purchaser thereof, before and at the time of the
execution of a deed of trust by his vendor, upon the entire tract, is
notice to the party taking such encumbrance of the rights of the pur.
chaser: Small v. Stagg, 95 Ills.
PRACTICE.

Filing additional Pleas-Diigence-Continuance.-Whereleave is
asked to file additional pleas eighteen months after the issues have been
made up, and on the eve of the trial, there will be no abuse of discretion or error in refusing the same, especially where no affidavit is filed,
showing a reasonable excuse for the delay: Fisher v. Greene, 95 Ill.
Where a defendant, after filing the general issue, and a continuance
of the cause has been had, discovers that he has a substantial defence,
not admissible under the general issue, he should, at the earliest convenient day, ask for special leave of the court to file an additional plea,
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so as not to take the plaintiff by surprise or delay the business of the
court: Id.
Where due diligence has not been used to procure the depositicn of
a party or witness, a motion for a continuance, based on the fact that
such deposition has not been returned, is properly overruled : Id.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See Trust.
SHERIFF'S SALE.

Fairnessof-Arot Impeachable by FraudulentDebtor.-A debtor who
has conveyed his property in order to defraud his creditors, has no standing in this court to question the fairness or adequacy of price, obtained
at a public sale of such premises under a creditor's bill to reach such
property; Guest v. Barton, 32 N. J. Eq.
SURETY. See Husband and
Wife.
Concealment by Creditorof Material Fact-Fraud.-Ifone who contemplates becoming a surety to another for a third person, applies to the
person to whom the security is to be given, for information as to the nature,
extent and risk of the obligation, or the circumstances, condition or character of such third person, while the person so applied to may refuse to
give such information, yet, if he undertakes to give it, he is bound to
disclose every material fact within his knowledge affecting the proposed
liability; and if he conceals any facts, unknown to the proposed surety,
which, if known, would have deterred him frou becoming surety (where
the latter has not the present means of ascertaining the fact, or where,
though he has such means, artifice is used to mislead him or to throw
him off his guard), this is a fraud which will relieve the surety from his
obligation. And this is especially so, where the surety becomes such at
the request of the person to whom the security is given : Remington
Sewing Machine Co. v. Kezertee, 49 Wis.
TAXATION. See National Banks.
Tax on Corporations-Act of 1866.-The tax on interest, paid by
corporations under section 122 of the Internal Revenue Law, as
amended by the Act of 1866, is an excise tax on the business of these
corporations, to be paid by them out of their earnings, income and
profits: Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Slack, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1879.
In order to secure payment of this tax, it was laid by Congress on
the subjects to which these earnings were applied in the usual course
of business of such corp6rations, namely, dividends, interest on funded
debt. construction, or some reserve fund held by the company: Id.
Such a tax is not invalidated by the provision that the amount of it
may be withheld from the dividend, or interest going to the stockholder,
or bondholder, though the latter be a citizen or subject of a foreign
government, with no residence in this country: Id.
TRESPASS.

Acting under lawful Authoriy, but in excess- When Trespasser ab
initio.-According to the general tendency of modern decisions, one
who does an act under a lawful authority will not be rendered a trespasser ab initio by subsequent irregularities, except where he does or
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consents to some positive act, which goes to show that the original
lawful act was done with an unlawful purpose: Grafton v. Carmichad.
48 or 49 Wis.
Accordingly, the plaintiff, in an attachment suit in justice's court,
may justify a taking of defendant's goods under a valid attachment,
although the subsequent judgment against the attachment defendant,
and sale of the goods on execution, are invalid by reason of a subsequent
failure of the justice to cause notice to such defendant to be posted, &c.,
as required by law where personal service of the writ is not made; and
this though such attachment plaintiff received a portion of the money
made on the execution: Id.
TRUST
Public Schol Trust-Violation of Trust-Injuncion at Suit of
Tax-payer.-A lease of a public school-house for the purpose of having
a private or select school taught therein for a term of weeks, is in
violation of the trust; and such use of the school-house may be
restrained at the suit of a resident tax-payer of the district : Weir v.
-Day,35 Ohio St.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
Decision of State Court- When not Binding.-The federal courts are
not bound by decisions of state courts upon questions of general commercial law: Oates v. The Bank, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
USURY.
Relief in Egui V-Terms on which Granted.-The practice in equity
has *always allowed the complainant to compel a discovery of the particulars of usurious transactions on the conditions only, that he waives the
forfeiture of the statutory penalty and submits to pay the debt with
legal interest, and no greater degree of strictness in setting up usury
will be required in an answer, but it may be stated generally, and need
not be more specific than is required in a bill: Jenkins v. Greenbaum
et al., 95 Ill.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Vendor's Lien-Assignment.-A vendor's lien is a right that can
only be enforced by the vendor himself, and is not assignable: Small
v. Stagg, 95 Ill.
See Insurance.
WAIVER.
WASTE.
Openiizg old 1ines by Tenant for Life.-Where there has been
diggings by the then owner of the fee for minerals for the manufacture
of copperas and Venetian red and Spanish brown, which diggings had
been discontinued for about seventy years, and there had been explorations or excavations by such owner of the fee for the ore as iron ore,
but, it proving valueless, the pursuit was thereupon abandoned and no
further working done. Held, that, the tenant for life had no right to
mine for ore, and that such mining was consequently waste: Gaines v
Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 32 N. J. Eq.
WHARF. See ConstitutionalLaw.

